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Abstract 
 
Special credit institutions in Bangladesh have dramatically increased the credit available to poor 
rural women since the mid-1980s.  Though this is intended to contribute to women's 
empowerment, few evaluations of loan use investigate whether women actually control this 
credit.  Most often, women's continued high demand for loans and their manifestly high 
propensity to repay is taken as a proxy indicator for control and empowerment.  This paper 
challenges this assumption by exploring variations in the degree to which women borrowers 
control their loans directly; reporting on recent research which finds a significant proportion of 
women's loans to be controlled by male relatives.   The paper finds that a preoccupation with 
'credit performance' - measured primarily in terms of high repayment rates - affects the 
incentives of fieldworkers dispensing and recovering credit, in ways which may outweigh 
concerns to ensure that women develop meaningful control over their investment activities. 
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GENDER, POWER, AND CONTROL OVER LOAN USE  
IN RURAL CREDIT PROGRAMMES IN BANGLADESH 
 
Anne Marie Goetz and Rina Sen Gupta 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Women in Bangladesh have gained an international reputation for their excellent credit 
performance in specialised credit institutions.  This achievement is all the more remarkable given 
the extreme socio-cultural constraints on women's productivity and their access to capital in 
Bangladesh.  The fact that they are a good credit risk - signalled in particular by their manifestly 
high propensity to repay loans when properly organised - has made them a priority target group 
for poverty-oriented credit programmes, most of which have seen a reversal over the 1980s in 
the gender balance of their membership and the flow of credit to favour women.  This paper 
assesses the degree to which women actually control loans once they have gained access to 
credit institutions.  Based on recent research on this issue1, it finds that a significant proportion 
of women's loans are directly invested by their male relatives, while women borrowers bear the 
liability for repayment.   The implications of this process for the assumed connection between 
access to credit and the empowerment of women are discussed.   
 
2. SPECIAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONS IN BANGLADESH:  THE SHIFT TO 
TARGETING WOMEN 
The special credit programmes which are justly famous in Bangladesh for their capacity to reach 
the poor have had notable success in overcoming institutional barriers to lending to women, 
although with the important exception of the Grameen Bank, these programmes were initially 
slow to address the needs of rural women borrowers.  In the 1980s strong gender differentials 
could be observed in the numbers of women borrowers in these programmes compared to men,  
and, even in the Grameen Bank, in the average size of loans to women compared to men, and in 
the proportion of overall credit they received in relation to their membership of these 
programmes (Saffilios-Rothschild and Mahmud, 1989:28-29).  From the late 1980s that situation 
has been changing  radically.   Over the period 1989-1992, 1.8 million rural women were 
reached by the three largest special credit programmes alone: the Grameen Bank, BRAC (the 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, a very large NGO), and the government's RPP 
(Rural Poor Programme, part of the Bangladesh Rural Development Board).  When other. 
smaller credit programmes are added, the total probably comes to well over 2 million.  This is 
more than double the number reached in the period between 1985-1988 (World Bank, 1990:113), 
evidence of a very high rate of expansion in women's membership of rural development 
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programmes since the mid-1980s.  Table I gives an indication of the rate of this expansion in a 
few organisations offering special credit facilities: 
 
{TABLE I HERE} 
 
Cumulative disbursements to women in these programmes have increased both absolutely and 
relatively over this period, so that the gender differentials observed in the mid-1980s in the 
proportion of credit awarded to women compared to men have been substantially reduced.  Table 
II summarises information on the percentage of special institutional credit reaching women 
relative to their membership numbers in the three largest programmes.   
 
{TABLE II HERE} 
 
In effect, there has been a near-reversal in the gender orientation of special credit programmes in 
Bangladesh since the 1980s; a de facto policy shift.  Credit provision for women is now seen as 
a powerful tool for institution-building at the grass-roots level, and has become a mainstay of 
many NGO efforts in rural areas.  BRAC has even decided to phase out the formation of new 
men's Village Organisations (VOs) and now concentrates on forming women's VOs (DLO, 
1993).  To keep this situation in perspective, however, it is worth remembering that women still 
receive an extremely small proportion of the cumulative amount of loans which have been 
disbursed by financial institutions to rural areas - about 5% over the 1980s (World Bank, 
1989:xii), and in spite of the above-noted increases, still only just over 5% in 1991 (BBS, 
1992:431). 
 
There are a number of reasons for the shift to targeting women through special credit 
programmes.  The 1980s brought increasing pressure from promoters of gender-sensitive 
development policy in Bangladesh's domestic development community and its foreign aid donors 
for the inclusion of women in rural credit and income-generating programmes.  Credit, it is 
argued, delivers a range of particular benefits when targeted to low-income women.  It is seen as 
a critical input for increasing women's employment in small-scale enterprises and is expected to 
encourage the adoption of improved technology to enhance the productivity of women's 
homestead-based income-generating and expenditure-saving work.  Further, as many studies 
show, increases in women's incomes improve the unique livelihood enhancement functions 
women perform for their households as brokers of the health, nutritional, and educational status 
of other household members.   It is also argued that credit represents a form of economic 
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empowerment which can enhance women's self-confidence and status within the family, as 
independent producers and providers of a valuable cash resource to the household economy. 
 
Whatever the reasons for targeting women, the tremendous increase of credit availability for 
women must be seen as a positive contribution to efforts to challenge gendered terms of access 
to productive resources and opportunities.   The phenomenal membership reach of special credit 
programmes is a success by any standards, and is all the more remarkable given the tight socio-
cultural constraints on women's market access and on their freedoms and capacities to shift 
significantly their rate of market engagement in Bangladesh.  In these circumstances, how far 
have women been able to convert access to credit, and membership of credit organisations, into a 
process of 'empowerment'; in what way does women's access to credit affect gender relations? 
 
3. EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF SPECIAL CREDIT PROGRAMMES 
Evaluations of credit programmes in Bangladesh (and elsewhere, cf: Thomas, 1993) do not 
typically ask this question directly, but rather, restrict themselves to analysing financial costs to 
the programme, and monetary benefits to the borrower.  Some evaluations do look at the 
contribution of these projects to enhancing the power positions of the poor - for example, 
assessing the impact on rural wages of providing the poor with alternative sources of income, or 
assessing the degree to which the poor's grass-roots organisations provide them with an 
institutional base for challenging the prerogatives of local elites (Rahman, 1986).  Still fewer 
evaluations assess the impact of credit on power relations of gender in the household and the 
community.2    By and large, beneficiary evaluations focus on quantifiable results: days of 
employment generated, rates of return to investment activities, degree of increase in household 
incomes.    
 
Where women borrowers are concerned, important strategic gains such as improvements in 
women's status in a range of institutions, starting with the household, are harder, 
methodologically, to identify, and therefore less is known about credit impact in these terms.  
Because most studies take the household as the unit of study, questions about the impact of 
credit on women in terms of its effects on intra-household decision-making, resource allocation, 
and empowerment are more difficult to ask.  Compounding this difficulty is uncertainty 
surrounding the meaning of terms like 'empowerment'; though popular, this is a term which is 
rarely precisely defined.  Does women's empowerment in the context of a credit programme 
imply a demonstrated capacity to invest loans profitably?  Or does it imply changed gendered 
relations, such as women's  greater control over household decision-making, greater physical 
security, reproductive control?  Or is the first achievement inseperable from the second?   In 
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evaluations of credit programmes, women's high demand for loans and regular repayment rates 
are commonly taken as proxy indicators of empowerment, understood as women's capacity to 
control loan use effectively.  These phenomena, however, do not necessarily reveal patterns of 
loan control within the household. 
 
Our research approached the issue of the relation of credit to women's empowerment from a 
perspective which, in relation to standard credit evaluations, was unconventional.  We were 
concerned with women's leadership development - understood as action to institutionalise 
women's interests in the development process.  As a result, the research poses the question of 
women's involvement in credit programmes in a distinctly political light -- raising issues of 
power, not just productivity.  This is an important conceptual distinction.  To simplify, it 
represents the difference between asking whether a concern to integrate women in the 
development process is about harnessing women's labour for development, or whether it is about 
development for women.3   Research methods were designed to assess the quality and meaning 
of women's experience of participation in these programmes, both as staff members and 
beneficiaries.   The research focused on BRAC's Rural Development Programme (RDP), and the 
CIDA-funded component of the government's Rural Poor Programme (RD-12).  Comparative 
samples were drawn from the Grameen Bank, and two women's NGOs: Thangemara Mahila 
Sebuj Sengstha (TMSS), and Shaptagram Nari Swanivar Parishad (SNPS). 
 
It is important to stress that the initial focus of the study did not concern actual credit use or 
control, but rather, the experience of participation.  In the course of the research, however, field 
workers and women beneficiaries alerted us to the phenomenon of women transferring loan 
control to men within their households.  To investigate this issue, we conducted qualitative 
studies of 275 loans (22 of these to men) across four organisations: BRAC (106 loans to women; 
22 to men), Grameen Bank (53), TMSS (39), and RD-12 (55), compiling detailed loan use 
histories on the basis of discussions with borrowers.4   
 
(a) Methodological Issues 
Methodologically, credit impact studies pose notoriously difficult problems to which this study 
was hardly immune.  Whether investigating income or empowerment effects, it is difficult to 
isolate the effect of credit from other variables such as group membership or training.  Methods 
for measuring profits and changes in household income depend on respondent recall, which may 
be weak in reporting on an activity which stretched over a year, where numeracy skills are low 
and records are not kept.  Translated into quantitative data it takes on a potentially misleading 
degree of precision and authority .  Women's credit enters general household funds and is used 
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for multiple purposes, while women's income-generating activities are managed in tandem with 
expenditure-saving work and homestead maintenance, making it difficult to filter out the exact 
number of days spent 'employed', or the exact rate of return to a specific activity.  In light of 
these problems, and given that we lacked the resources to conduct a detailed examination of loan 
investment patterns over time, we did not attempt to make quantitative evaluations of loan 
profitability.  Instead, we established whether women retained managerial control over the 
productive activity: from the initial loan proposal, to investment in productive assets, labour 
inputs, marketing, and use of profits.  Resource and time constraints also prohibited an in-depth 
exploration of questions of women's empowerment within the household and the community, 
which would have required more anthropological methods.  The focus on managerial control is 
designed to produce insights on one aspect of women's empowerment.  It provides, however, a 
relatively incomplete perspective, and there are many other aspects of women's empowerment 
which might have been explored.  As the subsequent discussion will illustrate, there are many 
ambiguities surrounding control over loan use - an apparent loss of control may disguise a 
negotiated transfer, where the nature of the negotiation and transfer, and the rights and privileges 
gained in return, may indicate a power achievement for the woman borrower.   
 
(b) Profile of the sample 
Loan histories were compiled with borrowers from credit groups in all four organisations in 
villages around Mymensingh, Bogra, Dinajpur, Jamalpur, and Rangpur.  This was a purposive 
selection; efforts were made to ensure representation of a variety of group and loan 
characteristics, such as years of membership in the credit programme, and size of loan.  6.3% of 
the loan histories came from groups which had been established for less than one year,  31.8% 
from groups aged between 1 and 2 years, 38.1% from groups between 3 and 5 years old,  and 
23.8% from groups with 6 or more years of activity.  In terms of loan amounts,  21% had taken 
loans for up to 1000TK, 38% between 1000-2000TK, 22% between 2000-3000 TK,  7% between 
3000-4000 TK, and 19% for 4000 TK or above.  This distribution is roughly proportional to the 
patterns of group maturity and average loan sizes across the four organisations, where rapid 
expansion means a preponderance of younger village credit groups with women taking smaller 
loans in the initial stages of group membership.  The most common investment activity of the 
borrowers surveyed was livestock and milch cow rearing (31.6%), followed by paddy husking 
and rice trade (18.5%), and small business and rural trade (16%).  Other investment activities 
included crop farming and land mortgaging (7.9%), rickshaw purchase (8%),  homestead 
cultivation (5.5%), construction activities including house building and installing latrines and 
tubewells (5.5%), poultry, sericulture, and fish culture (4%), and expenditures for illness and 
dowries (3%).   Numbers of borrowers heading their own households  were relatively low, with 
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just 13% of the sample widowed, divorced, or separated.  This number reflects the participation 
of female-headed households in special credit programmes. 
 
 
4. WOMEN'S CONTROL OVER LOAN USE 
A range of questions were asked about women's control over the productive process, for 
example, women were asked what activity they invested in, where the inputs and productive 
assets came from and who procured them, what they cost, how they were put to use, where 
outputs were marketed, for what price, what were the problems involved in the productive 
process, who the main user of the loan was in terms of labour input, and in terms of controlling 
accounts and general management.  On the basis of these questions we built up an index of loan 
control, as follows: 
 
FULL = full control over the entire productive process, including marketing. 
SIGNIFICANT = control over every aspect of the productive process with the sole exception of 
marketing (often the case in livestock or milch cow raising, where men are needed to manage the 
purchasing and selling process - cattle markets being a strongly masculine territory in 
Bangladesh). 
PARTIAL = loss of managerial control over the productive process, but the provision of 
substantial inputs of labour (as was often the case in paddy husking, where men provided the raw 
inputs and women were unable to give an account of the market prices of their products, and felt 
they had little say over the volume of weekly production). 
VERY LIMITED = minimal input to the production process, for example, small labour 
contributions (as when women wash vegetables for men to sell). 
NO INVOLVEMENT =  these were the cases where women provided no labour for activities 
which are culturally ascribed as masculine (for example, carpentry, crop farming, rickshaw 
peddling), and had no managerial involvement, or cases where women stated that they did not 
know how their men had used their money 
 
Figure I summarises findings on women's degree of loan control aggregated across the four 
organisations studied.    These loans assessments were made for the first or primary activity in 
which loans were invested, and does not include secondary activities or immediate re-investment 
of loan funds after rapid-yielding first investments. 
 
{Figure I here} 
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As Figure I shows, on average women retained full or significant control over loan use in 37% of 
the cases, while nearly 22% of respondents were either unable to give details of loan use, or were 
aware of how their husbands or other male household members had used loans, but were not 
themselves involved in the productive process.  About 63% of the cases fall into the three 
categories of partial, very limited, or no control; indicating a fairly significant pattern of loss of 
direct control over credit.  Of course, given the Bangladeshi context in which women's rights of 
control over productive resources are so constrained, the significance of these findings might 
perhaps more correctly lie in the 37% of cases in which women succeeded in retaining control 
over their loans.  Factors associated with positive rates of loan control will be discussed below, 
but this paper concentrates on the problem of the loss of loan control in order to assess 
implications for the presumed relationship between access to credit and empowerment.   Patterns 
of loan control vary between the four organisations studied.  These variations are presented later 
but this paper does not dwell on them.  This is in part because the research was not intended to 
be an evaluation of these credit programmes but rather, an investigation of the issue of loan 
control. Also, once disaggregated by organisation, problems of small sample size, and sample 
biases by region, group maturity, and patterns of loan investment, make observations for 
individual organisations unreliable. 
 
The issue of transfer of loan control has not gone entirely unnoticed in other studies.   Rahman's 
1986 study of 151 loans to women in the Grameen Bank found that 77% of women were using 
up to three quarters of their loans themselves, while 12% surrendered the entire loan to their 
husbands or other male guardians (1986:32-33).  White's 1991 study of loan use patterns in 140 
ActionAid loans in Bola suggests that approximately 50% of loans taken by women are used for 
men's productive activities, while another significant proportion are used for activities where 
gendered patterns of control are more ambiguous, such as consumption, stocking and resale of 
goods, or on-loaning for interest (1991:29).  Ackerly's recent study of 826 loans to 613 women 
borrowers in the Grameen Bank, Save the Children Fund (USA), and BRAC also registers loss 
of direct control over loans.  She details a range of variables indicating involvement in loan use -
- from labour involvement, involvement in purchasing inputs, selling products, and direct 
involvement in accounting.  Her dependent variable, 'women's knowledge of accounting',  is 
roughly equivalent to what is meant in this paper by 'managerial control', and includes 
knowledge of input costs, product yeild, and profitability.  While she finds 70% or more women 
investing their labour in loan-funded activities, women who had actual knowledge of accounting 
for the activity represented 49.2% of the BRAC sample, 52.4% of the Grameen Bank sample, 
and 62.3% of the SCF sample (Ackerly, 1995). 
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Variations in levels of loan control (or imputed control) recorded in other studies attest to the 
difficulty of making assessments about control over resources within the household.  The index 
used here has some advantages in comparison with other methods.  Rahman's 1986 study 
calibrates the cash amount of each loan actually used by the borrower herself, but this does not 
give a full account of the degree of managerial control women retain over their investment 
activities.  For example, in paddy husking, which was the second most important activity in 
which women in Rahman's study invested, there are a range of possible degrees of women's 
involvement.  Women certainly provide most of the labour involved, but do not have direct 
control over marketing the product, and may not have full control over the amounts husked each 
week, given that they must rely upon men to provide inputs.   
 
White's 1991 study identifies the main user on the basis of the investment activity - given that 
productive activities are strongly gendered in Bangladesh.  This method for classifying loan use 
is more sensitive to issues of loan control, as women are more likely to retain control over 
activities in which men do not engage.  But, as she acknowledges, it is a tentative indicator, 
"imposing a structure on something which is essentially fluid" (1991:29).    Even where loans are 
used for conventionally male activities, a range of managerial and contractual arrangements can 
be found through which women retain some control over loan use.  In our study, 28% of the 
loans had been invested in conventionally female productive activities, 56% in male activities, 
and the rest in 'family' investments such as housing, sanitation, rice storage, and payments for 
dowry or illness.  This does not correlate directly with the way the 'control' index ranked 
women's involvement in loan use, as the index was able to distinguish variations in control 
within conventionally gender-typed activities.  Thus a woman whose loan had gone towards the 
purchase of a rickshaw might still retain control over the productive activity if the rickshaw was 
licensed in her name, and if she had established a contract with the rickshaw-puller for a regular 
rent from the activity.  Cases such as these we classified as showing 'Significant' loan 
involvement on the part of the woman borrower.   In cases where loans were invested in non-
directly productive ways -- such as payments for dowry or medicine -- women were often the 
decision-makers, as they can have the greatest future stake in ensuring a daughter's entry to her 
in-laws' household is smooth, or in repairing the health of household members, especially if it is 
their own, and hence less likely to attract scarce general household resources.  Similar 
ambiguities obtained in assessing degrees of women's control of loans when credit is used for a 
range of consumption activities, such as food or clothing, paying off old debts, housing, 
sanitation, and safe water supply.  
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(a) Determinants of Loan control 
(i) Marital Status 
In this study, a range of circumstances and conditions were identified which correlated with 
degrees of loan control.  Women borrowers were more likely to retain full control over loan use 
when they were widowed, separated, or divorced, as Figure II indicates.  This is to be expected, 
given the more likely absence of productive men in female-headed households.  In some of these 
cases, however, single female household heads had given over their loans to male relatives 
beyond the immediate household, for example nephews and sons-in-law, in exchange for a 
guarantee of a regular food supply.  Again, this illustrates the ambiguity of assessing loan control 
-- these were registered under the 'No Involvement' category, yet they were not cases of 
straightforward male appropriation per se, as they involved an implicit contract and a viable 
economic and social survival strategy for the women involved, and could have significant 
empowerment effects such as increasing confidence and economic security.   
 
{Figure II here} 
 
Women's capacity to control loan use is likely to vary importantly according to stages in their 
life cycles, although this study did not examine this set of variables.    First wives in polygamous 
households might have greater control over household investment decisions, as might older 
married women.  It is probable that those least likely to be able to retain control over loans 
would be young, single and unmarried women, or new brides.   In the latter case, there is also a 
risk of appropriation of loan management by mothers-in-law.  In some of the credit societies we 
visited, mothers-in-law attended meetings in lieu of their young daughters-in-law to make loan 
instalments, having forbidden their new household members contact with strangers, especially 
where the field worker in question was male. 
 
(ii) Nature of investment activity 
As might also be expected, women were also more likely to retain control over loan use where 
they invested in traditional women's work, particularly livestock and poultry rearing, as shown in 
Figure III.  
 
{Figure III here} 
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The highest scorer in this respect was the category of poultry, sericulture, and fish culture, 
followed by livestock and milch cow rearing, homestead cultivation, and paddy husking.   The 
first three of these activities involve women in work whose products (eggs, milk, vegetables) can 
be marketed from the home, thus allowing women to retain control over the marketing process.  
In the cases of women investing in fish or sericulture, they had received intensive training from 
the development programme in question (BRAC), and also benefited from programme-supplied 
productive inputs, which eased their reliance on household men for marketing purposes at the 
front end of the productive cycle.  Cocoons produced through sericulture were also purchased in 
an internal market managed by BRAC.  Livestock fattening and milch cow rearing also affords 
women a greater degree of control than many other forms of investment.  Though opportunities 
for women to actually purchase or sell cattle in the market are restricted, livestock management 
is one of the few activities over which women hold rights of ownership and control.  Women 
who had used loans for construction, less conventionally seen as women's work,  also scored 
highly to the degree that they were implementing house repairs, or had used credit to build new 
homes or purchase homestead land registered in their names - a requirement in some special 
credit programmes (in particular the Grameen Bank).  
 
(iii) Size of Loan 
Loss of direct control seems to correlate broadly with increases in the cash size of loans up to a 
certain point, as Figure IV indicates.   This finding is corroborated in other studies.   Rahman 
found that Grameen Bank women loanees retained 100% of the cash amount of small loans (up 
to 1000 TK), falling to just 46% of the total amount when loans exceeded 4000 TK (1986:33).  
White also found that  ActionAid women borrowers were more likely to retain full control over 
smaller loans than larger ones (1991:29-30).   It would seem that the larger the cash size of a 
loan, the more likely it is to be used by other household members.   
 
{Figure IV here} 
 
Several explanations for this suggest themselves.  Some of women's investment activities are too 
small to absorb larger cash inputs, especially where no investment is being made in an improved 
technology, as is the case with livestock rearing or paddy husking.  It then becomes a more 
rational household decision to invest a larger cash loan in a potentially higher turn-over and 
higher-yielding male investment activity - such as rice stocking, rural trade, or rural transport.  
Another explanation may inhere in the gendered nature of rights over particular kinds of 
resources.  Just as small-scale investment activities are strongly distinguished by gender in 
Bangladesh, so too are different household resources.  Resources in kind, such as livestock, rice, 
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and homestead vegetables or animal products can come under women's control.  Women's 
savings habit of reserving a handful of rice - 'mushti chal' - before cooking every meal is 
symbolic of this.  This is one reason that informal credit exchanges between women often take 
the form of loans in kind, particularly rice, as women are able to retain control over this resource 
and can often bring it into the household without alerting male household members (Blanchet, 
1983; Haque, 1989).  Cash, however, especially in larger amounts, is more strongly culturally 
marked as a resource for men to control.  It is fungible primarily through the market, a public 
realm culturally prohibited to women.   
 
As Figure IV shows, there appears to be an increase in women's loan control at the higher end of 
the scale, which would contradict suggestions just made regarding the greater vulnerability of 
larger loans to male control.  Unfortunately the data is not robust enough to draw firm 
conclusions from this finding.  Only 30 borrowers in the sample received loans above 4000 TK 
in value, with 12 cases falling into the 'Full' or 'Significant' loan use category.  Six of the 12, two 
of them widows, invested in livestock, building on earlier loans for the same activity in which a 
few had accumulated small herds.  One had built a house which was registered in her own name, 
another had bought a rickshaw for 5000 TK and had a contractual arrangement with the rickshaw 
puller for a regular weekly income.  Two were using loans of over 5000 TK for activities 
benefiting from a high degree of technical support and monitoring from the lending organisation 
(BRAC) - one was managing a chick hatchery and another a cocoon-rearing unit.  In these two 
cases the extremely high degree of management input from the lending organisation may have 
contributed significantly to women's capacity to control loan use - a point to which we will 
return later.  One woman used her loan from the RPP to support a long-term family enterprise in 
running a tree nursery.  This was an extremely successful business, receiving strong support 
from the local government department of social forestry, and benefiting from a booming market 
for mulberry saplings to stabilise feeder roads and contribute to environmental and sericulture 
programmes.  Finally, one woman had used her loan to cover her daughter's dowry and wedding 
expenses.  Because of insufficient data, it is not possible here to determine whether these cases 
were unusual or whether they are of a more general significance. 
  
(iv) Years of Membership 
It might be expected that women's control over loan use would increase in tandem with years of 
experience as members of credit societies.  As women gain more experience of credit procedures 
and of managing small-scale enterprises, as their grass-roots organisations become 
institutionalised over time at the village level, and as they gain access to more training 
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opportunities, an overall accretion of competence and confidence in controlling loans would 
presumably follow.  Figure V shows that this is true up to a certain point.   
 
{Figure V here} 
 
Particularly high degrees of loan control are evident in credit societies with 3 to 5 years of 
institutional life, with degrees of loan control increasing steadily with each year of organisational 
membership up to that point.  After that point, however, loan control appears to diminish.  
Rahman's study  also records diminishing loan control over time, with the amount of a loan 
borrowers themselves use falling from 86.6% of the total loan amount in the first year to 66% in 
the fifth year of membership in the Grameen Bank, although the drop in actual cases she 
examines with more than 3 years of borrowing experience (just 11% of her cases) makes this 
finding less reliable (1986:35).   Since, over time, the cash amount of loans increases to reward 
good repayment, the drop in loan control over time can be explained, as above, as a reflection of 
the limitations to expansion of women's productive investments in comparison with the greater 
profitability of investing in male activities.  Patterns of diminishing loan control over time have 
important policy implications, raising questions about problems in increasing the profitability of 
women's enterprises with successive loans, problems in ensuring the sustainability of women's 
credit societies, and questions about building women's capacity to 'graduate' from special credit 
societies to other institutions in the rural financial market. 
 
In sum,  our findings raise as a problem the question of male control of a proportion of loans 
targetted to women.  This is in contrast to loan impact evaluations, where the issue of women's 
actual control of loan use tends to be obscured by the methodological focus on the household and 
the preoccupation with repayment rates.  Supporting evidence for these findings came in 
anecdotal form and from interviews with fieldworkers and observation of their work.  
Fieldworkers claimed that the increasing pressure on them to assess credit-worthiness of 
borrowers was prompting them to 'screen' the likely productivity of husbands of women 
borrowers.  In other words, some fieldworkers were assuming a priori that loans would be used 
by other family members.  Some field workers were quite candid about this process, admitting 
that when forming groups, husbands were approached first, and were persuaded to let their wives 
join in return for the promise of credit - implicitly, for the husband.  This has worrying 
implications for the inclusion of women heading their own households in these programmes, in 
spite of the fact that this is the category of borrower most likely to control loans fully. 
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Most telling of the supporting evidence were the interviews with the 22 male borrowers.  In the 
course of relating loan use histories, many of these men provided detailed accounts of multiple 
loans they had invested in activities such as livestock rearing or paddy husking, in addition to 
more conventionally male activities such as rickshaw pulling, rice trading, itinerant trading, and 
so on.  When these accounts were checked against group records, no trace could be found of 
some of the loans which had been described.  Asked about this, the men explained that in these 
cases they had taken "a 'woman's' loan".  In other words, no clear distinction in actual rights of 
ownership over credit was made.  Women did not exhibit this kind of conceptual slippage 
regarding their husband's loans, even though men's loans, just like women's,  enter into the 
household as a new resource for general benefit.   
 
4. LOAN USE WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD AND LOAN REPAYMENT 
The implications of these findings about loan transfer within the household are very complex.  It 
cannot simply be assumed that individual control over a loan is equivalent to empowerment, nor 
does the phenomenon of transferring a loan in and of itself signal a loss of power for women.  To 
begin with, conventional banking assumptions about individual loan use and responsibility may 
be mis-placed in the context of the prevailing gender division of labour in household production 
in  Bangladesh.   The household is a joint venture, and the gender division of labour is such that 
full, individual control of the productive process is virtually impossible for women given the 
gendered nature of access to markets.  A complementary division of labour which assigns 
marketing to men makes it virtually inevitable that women's loans will be used jointly by 
themselves and productive men within the household.  In the case of men, though they tend more 
often to manage loans individually, they too rely on divisions of labour by gender and age to 
accomplish productive tasks as a joint family process (Montgomery, Bhattacharya, and Hulme, 
1995:102).  However, men's near-monopoly of access to the market also means that they have 
greater economic control over household income-generating activities, and with the main 
responsibility for cash transactions, they are identified as the earners of family income, 
regardless of the contributions of other family members.  Within this constraint women do have 
strategies to assert economic control.  Village ethnographies have shown that considerable 
variation in gendered patterns of income and asset control within the household give women 
control over a certain range of household decisions (often relating to consumption).  Women also 
employ a range of strategies to establish control over assets, through informal lending of cash or 
paddy to other women as a form of dispersed insurance against future crises, investing in 
livestock, and saving small amounts of paddy, all of which constitute 'female assets' which are 
out of the immediate sphere of male control (ibid, and White, 1992). 
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For any household, the gendered division of labour in production, the gender divisions around 
control of economic activities and cash proceeds, and the consequent gendered differences in 
consumption patterns, will affect the way credit is used.  Because control of cash is so strongly 
identified as a masculine business, expanded opportunities for women to have access to cash 
loans could have a profound impact on gender relations.  As Montgomery et al point out: 
"[w]omen borrowing cash and generating cash income tend towards a contradiction of existing 
norms" (1995:99).  However, without parallel interventions designed to ease women's direct 
access to the market, improve their productive skills, and access to technology, the role of 
mediators such as male relatives remains critical, with implications for women's authority over 
economic decision-making.  In this context, new cash inputs to the household through women 
are likely to be identified by household males as a resource for their use.  An example of this was 
given by a 40 year old widow,  Sultana, whose elder son uses her loan to buy paddy, which she 
parboils and dries, and which he then takes to the rice mill for processing.  When asked about her 
family's feelings about her membership of a credit organisation, she replied: "My sons are happy 
that I have access to a loan, but they say that they have to repay it so their feelings are mixed"; in 
other words, her sons assumed responsibility for managing the loan.   
 
When credit is invested in conventional women's activities, gender role ascriptions are not 
challenged, and the increase in welfare to the household may be minimal, given the constraints 
to profitable expansion of most of these ventures.  In addition, women's labour burden may be 
increased without any significant concommittant increase in control over the productive process.  
As Montogmery et al suggest:  "[w]hen the division of labour and distribution of authority over 
resources remains uncontested, it is not easy to argue that there has been a positive change in 
women's degree of 'empowerment'." (ibid: 95).   And they add that the use of credit "for 
conventional activities, undertaken according to conventional patterns, may actually strengthen 
the intra-domestic distribution of power which is heavily in favour of male members" (ibid:104).   
 
There are, nevertheless, a range of plausible benefits to women of transfering loan control from 
the point of view of enhancing their status within the household.  It is often argued in 
Bangladesh that even when men do control women's loans, women's overall status within the 
household increases because they are acknowledged as an important new source of revenue.  
Rahman provides some evidence for this.  She found that Grameen Bank women borrowers who 
had transferred their entire loan to a male relative had a higher nutritional status, and had more 
money spent on their clothing and medical needs, than the wives of male borrowers (1986:60).  
But inevitably, expenditures on women in the household are lower when men control women's 
loans than when women have full control.  As Rahman's study also shows,  10% less was spent 
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on the medical expenses of women who had transferred their loans to husbands, than on the 
medical expenses of women controlling their own loans.  In cases where men were the direct 
borrowers, fully 74% less was spent by them on their wives' health (ibid:60).  
 
Anecdotal evidence from BRAC suggests familial stability to be an important reflection of 
women's increased status through loan access, where one of the reasons women give for handing 
over loans to husbands is the need to preserve their marriages (Jiggins, 1993).  It is important not 
to deride or dismiss these sorts of choices.  In a context where women's life chances are directly 
related to security in marriage, transferring credit to men is an important survival strategy.  This 
is especially so given that small loans and women's low productivity hardly offer the prospects 
of building an alternative institutional survival base to the marital household.   A narrow concern 
with women's control over loans risks obscuring the importance of the role of women's credit in 
easing household financial crises and preserving family stability - as when, for example, credit is 
used to pay off a husband's debts and hence ward off the possibility of his having to leave to 
avoid creditors (Jiggins, ibid).   
 
In addition, women may use credit as a bargaining chip to allow them access to other 
opportunities available through credit organisations -- opportunities to congregate with other 
women, to have access to skills training or functional education or health inputs.  For example, a 
BRAC borrower, Farida, whose husband had used her loan to mortgage land and farm it,  
explained to us: "If I don't give him all the money then I can't stay with BRAC - he makes all the 
decisions about what to do."  For her, waiting to attend a vegetable gardening training session at 
the BRAC Area Office, this was a worthwhile trade-off.  Other trade-offs of great value to 
women include the exchange of control over a loan for a guaranteed food supply from the person 
controlling the loan (this is especially important for widows), and sometimes, the right to having 
more household resources spent on their own and their children's health or clothing. 
 
In Bangladesh's poverty context, women's access to credit represents a source of capital 
acquisition for men, and may induce a re-valuing of women's contribution to household survival.  
The danger is that this may lead to the manipulation of women, putting pressure on them to gain  
membership of a credit group.  Anecdotal evidence about the Grameen Bank suggests that 
women who are unsuccessful in gaining loan access, or who have to wait too long for their turn 
to get a loan, are experiencing increases in domestic violence from frustrated husbands (see also 
Haque, 1993:60 - 62).   An analogy can be made to the problem of dowry inflation, where some 
argue that increased competition to raise the price of dowry reflects a qualitative drop in 
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women's status.  One field worker made this connection directly, saying: "Actually, it (credit) is 
just another form of dowry".   
 
The phenomenon of transfer of loan control may be introducing greater tensions within the 
household, for all that it may enhance men's appreciation of women in the household.  Women 
still have to repay their loans, however and by whomever they are used.  If they are not 
generating cash income themselves,  they will have to demand weekly loan repayment funds 
from their husbands.  As White points out, this is something they do not normally do.  It can 
reinforce (or create new) gendered patterns of dependency and may produce new sources of 
tension (1991:30).  Where husbands refuse to repay, or invest credit badly, or abscond altogether 
with the money, the pressure is on women to find repayment funds from their other homestead 
activities.  Women's high repayment rates in these cases may attest less to profitable loan use 
than to their desire to retain membership of one of the few social and public institutions to which 
they have legitimate access beyond the household. 
 
How do women repay when their loans are not invested by themselves?  Evidence from the 
research suggests a range of strategies.5 
 
- Where there is a good relationship between the borrower and her male relative, men supply the 
instalments on a weekly basis.  Many women said their male relatives were obliging in this 
respect, and some spoke of this arrangement in quasi-contractual terms.  This situation can result 
in increased financial responsibility for women and greater respect within the family.   Arguably, 
however, the developmental objectives of targeting credit to women can be eroded if a direct 
relation between personal loan use and repayment responsibility is ruptured.  Aside from the 
issue of using credit to increase the productivity of women's labour, its role as a tool for 
institution-building may be lost.  In some cases, we observed men coming to women's weekly 
group meetings and submitting the loan instalment on behalf of their absent wives.  This 
deprives women of the benefits of regular group attendance and social contact. 
 
- Where husbands may not be able to supply instalments, women may substitute funds from their 
'expenditure saving' homestead activities.  Many borrowers said they paid weekly instalments 
out of sales from eggs, fruit, and home-grown vegetables.  Some supplied loan instalments from 
their regular savings habit of reserving a handful of rice before meals.  Where loan repayment is 
coming from other sources of women's domestic income, this may deplete daily consumption 
resources within the household, as well as resources otherwise kept for savings. 
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-  In a minority of cases, husbands were unwilling, as opposed to unable, to supply weekly 
instalments.  In cases where women could not supply repayments from other sources, they were 
forced into a supplicant relationship to their husbands.  Some women borrowers admitted that 
increased tensions within the household associated with instalment recovery from men forced 
them into pressuring their husbands for money, which resulted in violence.  Field workers, 
especially women field workers, were aware of this problem and felt that it had worsened, 
although we were unable to assess the prevalence of domestic violence or any quantitative 
increase.   
 
As Ackerly notes, in the last two types of situation, women's responsibility for credit is not 
matched by their economic and political resources in the family (1995:59).  Women do have 
strategies to resist, of course, and as the following story provided by a woman field worker 
shows, the role of lending institutions in supporting their rights of control over loans is 
important: 
 
One woman gave her loan to her husband.  But he refused to repay the money.  She had 
so many problems getting money from him - and had to repay by selling eggs, chicks, 
etc.  He also beat her when she tried to get loan instalments from him.  She managed to 
repay and asked for another.  But she told the field workers that she didn't want money to 
go to the husband.  She said: "Give me the cash, I'll buy a cow".  On the loan 
disbursement day, the husband came to the office to get the money.  The woman told the 
office to forget she had a husband.  "Think of me as husband-less and give me the 
money."  When the office tried to give it to the husband she said: "Look, I am under 
double pressure, from my husband who won't repay and you who want my money back".  
She went and bought a cow with the husband and the field workers and brought it close 
to her house in the village so she could control it, in case the husband tries to take it 
away.  
 
Where men use women's loans, gender relations within the household are in effect (if not 
intention) providing a tool to ease the work of credit institutions in recovering loans.  Women 
may have a higher incentive than men for loan repayment -- it allows them to retain access to 
village groups, whereas men have many more opportunities for social contact.  Also, women are 
more vulnerable to pressure to repay.  They are easy to locate, being much less able than men to 
leave a locality temporarily to evade field workers, and they are easier to intimidate into 
repayment than men, who can always threaten violence.  In effect, the household is internalising 
the high transaction costs of lending to men.  These costs are primarily those of monitoring 
men's loan use and enforcing regular repayment.  Women in effect offset these costs by using 
intra-household gender relations of obligation or persuasion to recover weekly loan repayments.    
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This does not imply that this is the intention of credit organisations, whose reasons for lending to 
women are not that they should act as conduits for credit to men.  However, it is important to 
consider the motivations and practices of field workers, who, distant from top-level policy 
makers, deal with local realities and mediate programme inputs on the basis of their own 
perception of people's needs and capabilities.  The following candid comment from a 
government field worker illustrates how an instrumental view of the purpose of lending to 
women can develop:  "We are much better at getting our loan money back now that we are using 
women as middle-men (sic)".  
 
This instrumental approach to women as conduits for credit for the family plays on, and 
reinforces, traditional cultural notions of womanhood, with women seen as moral guardians of 
the household and policers of recalcitrant men.  The implications of this process for the way men 
are being constructed culturally in relation to credit operations are also disturbing.   In the formal 
credit system which reaches primarily middle-class farmers,  male defaulting is so endemic as to 
constitute probably the most significant supply-side transaction cost which discourages formal 
credit institutions from lending to (male) rural producers.  For example, within the nationalised 
commercial banking system, loan recovery from farmers fell from just below 50% in 1980-81 to 
25% in 1985-86, and was just above 40% in 1987 (UNDP, 1989:66).  In response to the recovery 
crisis, the flow of formal credit has been drastically cut back since 1985, while extensive 
rescheduling and expensive measures of interest remission and interest rate subsidies have been 
introduced (World Bank, 1989:132).  Between 1987-88 and 1990-91 agricultural credit 
disbursements by nationalised commercial banks, the Bangladesh Krishi (Agriculture) Bank, the 
BRDB, and other formal financial institutions shrank by 54%, not taking into account inflation 
(Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1992:431).  On the non-governmental side, rural development 
organisations appear to be experiencing difficulties working with men, especially where credit 
operations are concerned, and as a consequence are shrinking their operations; BRAC's decision 
to freeze the formation of new men's VOs has already been mentioned.  Field workers in 
development programmes justify this on the basis of problems experienced working with men:  
their lack of commitment to village credit groups, their poor financial discipline when it comes 
to repaying loans, the difficulty of enforcing loan repayment given men's greater capacity to 
evade both development agents and the law, and the threat of violence from men.  Many 
fieldworkers described male credit society members as 'touts', or petty criminals.  Men's higher 
default rates may owe to the greater risks involved in their investment activities, the 
demonstration effect of the way wealthier rural borrowers default with impunity, and the greater 
range of opportunities available to men for squandering their credit which come with 
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urbanisation and westernisation: gambling, tobacco, prostitution, and cinemas and restaurants in 
town.  Lower levels of commitment to village-level institutions may owe to men's greater range 
of choice in participating in institutions beyond the village.   
 
In the context of the general retrenchment in the flow of formal institutional credit to the rural 
sector, the slow-down in the formation of new credit societies for landless men is contributing to 
the impression that men's access to formal and special credit opportunities is shrinking in 
relation to women (even though in actual fact they still benefit from the lion's share of available 
rural credit).  But this perception may have as corrosive an effect on household well-being and 
gender relations as the exclusion of women from institutional credit opportunities has had in the 
past.  Unable to gain access to the resources needed to fulfil their traditional functions as family 
providers, poor men are having to renege on their responsibilities, increasing the rate of family 
fragmentation.   But if poverty and family fragmentation has meant the loss of the tradition of 
male support for women, exclusionary aspects of male prejudice and control which sustain 
discrimination in productive opportunities outside the household, as well as in intra-household 
consumption, have adapted to the changed circumstances (Chen, 1990:217;  Cain et al, 
1979:410;  Alam and Matin, 1984:9).  One way in which male dominance persists and 
reconstitutes itself is through the exploitation of women as new sources of labour and capital.  It 
is hardly surprising that women's loans are being treated as a new resource for men in this 
context. 
 
There is a danger that excluding men from credit opportunities may intensify the exploitation of 
women within the household, and at the same time, limit the possibilities of achieving broader 
attitudinal change amongst men.  Policy makers need to bear in mind that in situations of intense 
competition for scarce resources, gender power conflicts will be aggravated.   In a context such 
as Bangladesh, men retain by far the greater balance of socio-cultural power, such that women 
can hardly defend such small gains as they might make participating in development 
programmes from male control unless men's attitudes change or men perceive a tangible benefit 
to themselves.  This can be achieved through intensive qualitative investments in changing men's 
perceptions of women's worth, which is often beyond the capacity or commitment of 
development programmes, or through ensuring that men's access to resources is not constrained 
in proportion to women's increasing access, in an apparently zero-sum manner.  Ideally, the two 
should go together. 
 
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAMME DELIVERT PATTERNS AND 
ORGANISATIONAL INCENTIVES 
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The concerns raised in this paper call for a policy response to enhance women's control over loan 
use.   It is important to stress that what is at issue here refers not just to credit programmes, but to 
all manner of development inputs targeted to women; the point is that more attention needs to be 
paid to gender relations as mediators of development resources.   This is an extremely difficult 
area for programme interventions as it implies penetrating the household to tackle gender power 
relations and suggests a degree of social engineering for which methods are unknown, even if a 
commitment to it existed, which to date has not in the development process.  Many other more 
practical and immediate policy responses suggest themselves, including evening the balance 
between social development objectives and credit performance, improving women's productivity, 
opening their access to markets, protecting their rights of ownership over assets, enhancing their 
managerial skills and control, and investing in larger-scale enterprises in which women's 
investments might be protected.  These measures will be discussed below, and the performance 
of the organisations studied will be compared in relation to current policy differences between 
them. 
 
(a) The Balance Between Social Development Inputs and Credit Performance 
Special credit programmes vary in their investments in advancing members' perceptions of social 
issues and in the training they offer for human resource development which can enhance loan use 
as well as household well-being and structural change at the local level.  The Grameen Bank 
offers the fewest support services for these social goals, beyond the 'Sixteen Decisions' about 
household and community management and social justice which members recite at the beginning 
of group meetings.  It has started, however, to offer credit on special terms for investments in the 
quality of household life, like loans for tubewells, latrines, and housing.  The RPP's RD-12 
programme also offers social development services and leadership training for women, as do the 
women's NGOs.   BRAC offers an enormous range of supplementary services to bolster 
leadership and social development in its VOs.  These range from paralegal training, health and 
family planning facilities, a vast non-formal primary education (NFPE) programme for members' 
children, and leadership training for VO management committees.  Each group is visited once a 
month by a range of specialist Programme Officers who lead intensive issue-based discussions in 
these areas.  Nevertheless, rapid expansion has forced a cut back in its preparatory work with 
borrower groups.  The one-year induction period, with literacy training, which BRAC conducted 
in an earlier incarnation of its credit programme has been cut to two months of awareness-raising 
and functional education.   
 
With the exception of women's NGOs, these inputs are often not sufficiently tailored to women's 
gender-specific social needs.   'Leadership training' in many organisations consists primarily of 
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rules and methods for credit society management, not methods to counter gender-specific 
constraints to assertiveness, confidence, and power within households and the local community.  
Few of the large special credit institutions provide Gender and Development training to their 
staff, although BRAC and RD-12 have recently introduced this training for field managers and 
headquarters staff.   Unsurprisingly, women's NGOs differ in these respects.  Consciousness-
raising amongst women borrowers is a central programme component, and for TMSS, pursuing 
cases through local courts of illegal divorce, deprivation of inheritance rights, default on 
maintenance payments, and rape, represent a significant part of the workload of its staff. 
 
The tangible shift in organisational incentives in larger special credit institutions away from 
social development and institution-building has been exacerbated by donors' interests in seeing 
the development of financially self-sustaining credit programmes.  This process is clearly 
illustrated in the government's RD-12 programme.  CIDA's support for RD-12 will be phased out 
over the next three years.  The consequent imperative for the programme to become self-
sufficient prompted the introduction in mid-1993 of a range of new staff incentives to increase 
the magnitude of loan disbursal and the efficiency of loan recovery.  Each Field Officer is 
expected to distribute a minimum of 625,000TK annually to 250 members (10 groups, 25 
members each).  Salary bonuses will be supplied on a pro-rata basis to those who distribute 
greater amounts and achieve a 100% recovery rate.  The new incentive system concentrates 
organisational attention on conventional banking concerns.  Pressure on field staff to disburse 
and recover greater volumes of credit may have negative consequences for women borrowers.  
They may be encouraged to take larger loans, but without adequate technical backup for 
improving their productivity and marketing capacity, they may find themselves unable to realise 
effective profits.  Larger volumes of credit coming into households are vulnerable to mis-routing 
for immediate consumption needs, and to appropriation by male relatives, leaving women more 
heavily indebted than before. 
 
As credit and service delivery come to supplant more qualitative and elusive social change 
objectives, earlier concerns with developing organisational solidarities amongst the poor have 
receded somewhat.  BRAC's goal of forming federations of landless groups is now being 
underplayed, and the meaning of 'institution-building' is shrinking to encompass merely the 
formation and induction of new groups.  This is unfortunate, for as women's primary societies 
grow in number, federating their activities might allow them to take up leadership and decision-
making roles in a more public way.  The government's system of federating landless groups 
through the RD-12 Thana Bittoheen Central Cooperative Associations is more promising in this 
respect, in spite of problems of elite capture.  It offers the possibility for women to take decision-
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making positions within the sphere of credit administration at the local level.  In many TBCCAs, 
women's groups form the majority of the membership; in three, women were elected as 
Chairpersons in 1993. 
 
Finally, the rush to 'scale-up' credit delivery arguably has some implications specific to the 
problem of women's capacity to control loans.  Pressure to register new borrowers rapidly may 
lead to relaxed targeting, with better-off women gaining access to loans,  while those in more 
need, but with fewer initial resource endowments, such as women heading their own households 
or the poorest women, may not be seen as sufficiently creditworthy.  Pressure to disburse and 
recover larger loans may erode a concern with ensuring that women control loans themselves, 
rather than ceding control to male household members whose investment activities tend to be 
more productive.  The following quotation from a woman field worker illustrates how this can 
happen: 
One woman who had neither children nor a husband was doing domestic labour, and 
became a samity member and applied for a loan.  I supported her loan proposal for a 
small trade business but the office did not approve it.  The office said she has no husband 
or son so how will she run the business?  I think she could have, that's why I proposed 
her!   
 
(b) Improving Women's Productivity 
Low-income women borrowers in Bangladesh invest cautiously in low-risk, familiar, low 
productivity enterprises.  A recent RD-12 study of loan use shows that rates of return for 
women's income-generating activities average 145% while rates for men average 211% 
(Matienzo, 1993:34).  By far the bulk of loans taken by women in special credit programmes are 
invested in traditional activities such as paddy husking, petty trade, and livestock rearing, most 
of which show a negative return to labour when it is imputed to the male agricultural wage rate 
(Hossain, 1984).  Livestock fattening and milch cow rearing are exceptions, because they 
involve relatively low-intensity labour inputs which can be distributed to other household 
members, children especially.  Nevertheless, livestock rearing offers limited scope for 
significantly shifting women's rate of market engagement through technological changes or 
increased employment. Like women's other traditional enterprises, it is a low-maintenance 
activity which is home-centred and is part of the cultural ascription of low value to women's 
work. 
 
By and large, none of the larger special credit programmes have succeeded in shifting women 
out of traditional income-generating activities, although most do acknowledge the importance of 
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encouraging more profitable and socially valued non-traditional forms of entrepreneurship for 
women.  The Grameen Bank is the most 'minimalist' of all the special credit institutions in terms 
of its support for skills development, and though it does operate a small sub-programme which 
experiments with improved farming techniques, the majority of its borrowers invest in traditional 
activities, most often livestock rearing.  The RD-12 has regionally-based Technical Resource 
Teams which promote new technologies to improve the productivity of the enterprises of the 
landless,  and is developing programmes to encourage women to make non-traditional 
investments.  BRAC is most comprehensive in supporting higher profit investments, providing 
training, technical advice, access to inputs, and other services in the following sectors:  
irrigation, livestock, poultry, fisheries, social forestry and vegetable cultivation, and sericulture.  
In addition, its Rural Enterprises Project experiments with new businesses such as women-run 
restaurants, poultry feed mills and chick hatcheries, mechanics workshops, apiculture, 
warehouses, and pearl culturing.  These activities are promoted as integrated packages to 
borrowers.  Credit is tied to specific skills training, some of the credit is provided in kind - for 
example as chicks for poultry-rearing units - and in some cases, such as sericulture, backward 
and forward linkages are made at different points along the production process.   Some of these 
programmes train women in occupations which provide paid employment - as paravets, poultry 
vaccinators, or tree caretakers. 
 
Promoting higher-risk, higher skill, and higher profit non-traditional activities for women, 
however, confronts head-on complex problems relating to the way gender affects the perceived 
value of different forms of employment.  In the first place, where women move into activities 
which compete with 'men's work', gender power conflicts may be exacerbated.  In the second, 
there is no automatic connection between non-traditional occupations for women and 
improvements in their status relative to men. 
 
When women move into non-traditional forms of enterprise, men may simply assume control 
over activities which involve higher cash investments and more complex technology.  Some 
evidence of this comes from a BRAC study of women's experience investing in one of the 
higher-profit ventures - women-owned restaurants - encouraged through its Rural Enterprise 
Project.  Khan's study analyses six women's experiences of managing large loans (on average 
6000 TK) for Shuruchi ('Good Food') restaurants.  She found that with the exception of one 
widowed woman,  women's male relatives had taken over the management of these restaurants, 
with none of the married women feeling they owned these enterprises.  Just one woman, the only 
literate woman in the sample, participated in managing accounts (Khan, 1993).  Interestingly, the 
widowed woman in the sample had also lost control of her restaurant, but to her apparently more 
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dynamic married sister (ibid:21).  This brings up the important issue, mentioned earlier, of power 
differences between women according to life cycle stages and social status.  Investing in shifting 
women's rate of market engagement, therefore, requires not just the introduction of new 
technologies and skills training, but strong support for women's rights of ownership over new 
enterprises.  Although limited by its sample size of six, Khan's study hints at the importance of 
literacy and numeracy in enhancing women's managerial capacities.  Accounts keeping, and in 
some cases, coping with official formalities and interactions with suppliers and clients, requires 
levels of education which the majority of the low-income women members of special credit 
programmes lack.  Unfortunately, as mentioned in the first section of this paper, few special 
credit programmes are making the long-term investments in literacy and numeracy training 
which are necessary for the development of effective accounting and management skills. 
 
When women are undertaking new entrepreneurial investments individually, whatever the level 
of organisational support, their resources are bound to be more vulnerable to male control given 
women's dependence on maintaining positive relations with men within the household.  Where 
investments are made jointly in enterprises collectively managed by women outside the 
boundaries of individual households, there may be more potential for protecting women's assets 
from male relatives, as well as for achieving economies of scale.  Larger-scale enterprises using 
new technologies - such as mechanised rice mills - can help develop management skills, and may 
eventually provide wage employment opportunities for other women.  They also have the 
potential to provide women with a significant non-farm production base in the rural economy 
and to develop linkages to other productive sectors.  Efforts have been made in this direction by 
some special credit programmes:  BRAC offers credit for the joint management of deep 
tubewells, the Grameen Bank for fisheries management, and the women's NGO, SNPS, for 
power tillers.  Unfortunately these efforts, in Bangladesh as elsewhere, have been hobbled by 
severe management problems and by free rider problems (Hossain, 1988).   
 
They have also aroused both class and gender hostility.  A good example is SNPS's programme 
of providing credit to groups of women for managing power tillers.  Women in these groups 
were able to rent out their equipment and labour for preparing crop land for ploughing, thereby 
gaining access to a lucrative new form of employment providing a valuable agricultural service, 
and in the process, making a powerful public statement about women's productive capacities.  By 
the second year of operation in one area, landlords and farmers incensed both by the loss of an 
important male source of income (from traction ploughing) and by women's transgression of an 
important symbolic boundary between the home and the field, grouped together to purchase their 
own power tillers, pushing the women's group out of business. 
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This speaks to the critical importance of applying an analysis of gendered power relations to 
policy efforts to enhance women's productivity and access to resources.  There is a tendency to 
assume that changes in socio-cultural perceptions of women's worth will follow changes in 
women's productivity.  For example, the economist Adnan comments:  "The capacity to earn 
market incomes has also lead to the re-valuation of the status of women by their fathers, 
husbands, and immediate families, as well as the communities to which they belong" (1989:12, 
emphasis in text).  However, this underspecifies the importance of gender relations in affecting 
the perceived value of what women and men do, which is less a function of what the activity is 
or what income it generates, than of the power relations in which it is embedded.  Numerous 
studies of gender relations in the region show that the cultural discounting of the value of 
women's work does not necessarily alter when women's work takes place outside of the 
household or when their contribution to the household takes the form of a cash income 
(Standing, 1991; White, 1992; Bardhan, 1986; Chen, 1990).  This should not be taken as an 
argument against encouraging non-traditional forms of self- and formal employment for women, 
but rather, as a reminder of the importance of holistic strategies which support women who take 
these risks, which build up mutual support networks amongst women, which provide adequate 
skills training and other forms of technical backup, and which encourage male support. 
 
(c) Marketing 
None of the large special credit programmes offer facilities to enhance women's access to 
markets.  BRAC has made various experiments with establishing space in local markets for 
women, but these have been abandoned, although an account of the reasons for this is not 
available.  Women's exclusion from markets is perhaps the greatest constraint to their 
productivity.  It means that they lose control over a critical phase of the production process and 
are unable to make informed assessments of market demand and new productive opportunities.  
Improving women's market access might be the single most effective way of enhancing their 
control over loans, as well as expanding their public presence and their self-confidence.  Policy 
efforts to open rural markets to women will be likely to encounter severe male opposition.  As in 
the case of enhancing women's productivity, it will require considerable investment in support 
systems - including such measures as providing transportation and indeed, security measures to 
protect women from physical assault. 
 
(d) Enhancing Managerial Control 
Some potential policy responses to enhance women's managerial control are evident from the 
above discussion.  Measures likely to help are greater and continuous investment in literacy and 
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numeracy training, investment in attitudinal change in men, and women too, regarding women's 
rights over their own resources, skills development and technical inputs directly relevant to the 
loan investment activity, overcoming constraints to women's access to rural markets, the 
development of solidarities amongst women, especially beyond the limited horizons of the 
individual credit society, effective support for viable collective enterprises, and measures to 
guarantee women's ownership of productive assets.  As will be clear from the discussion so far, 
however, enhancing women's managerial control in the context of gender relations in 
Bangladesh is no easy project.  It touches on problems which are beyond the scope of any single 
organisation to solve - such as the inadequate legal foundation for women's economic rights, 
especially as concerns rights of ownership and inheritance.  An important issue in this respect is 
the national religious environment, with many rural development organisations reporting 
increased levels of opposition from Islamic groups in recent years.  Such problems require state-
level responses.  However, since the 1980s the Bangladeshi state has sought to palliate its 
legitimation anxieties by aligning itself, increasingly, with Islamic interests (Kabeer, 1989;  
Goetz, 1991), which has meant that an effective public commitment to social change in women's 
interests is lacking. 
 
Policy efforts to enhance women's loan control may run the risk of introducing a degree of 
organisational control and surveillance over women's loan investment decisions which 
unacceptably undermine women's autonomy in decision-making over loan use.  To dictate and 
closely monitor loan investment strategies may actually undermine a household survival 
strategy.  Women's credit enters households under conditions which policy cannot predict.  It 
may be desperately needed to mitigate a short-term consumption crisis, which once resolved, can 
enhance a household's productivity.  Other problems might arise if loans are given in kind, rather 
than cash, or if cash loans to women are kept very small.  These measures are likely to ensure 
women's loan control, but they may also construct women differently as credit clients than men; 
as not fully individually responsible, as incomplete participants in rural economies, where their 
organisational membership is experienced as patronising and tutelary, not empowering.  There is 
an extremely fine line between recognising constraints on women's freedom of manoeuvre, and 
reinforcing the terms of those constraints by taking them as givens.  It may be tempting for credit 
organisations to avoid this dilemma altogether by sticking to measures known to be associated 
with higher degrees of women's control, for example by lending small amounts for fail-safe 
activities such as livestock rearing.  But lending patterns such as these will not contribute to 
broader goals of empowering women to change the terms of gender relations in the household 
and the community.  In addition, they only modestly contribute to goals of poverty alleviation, 
28 
 
where small investments become little more than loan-repayment schemes, not long-term 
income-accumulation strategies. 
 
The women's NGO TMSS has an interesting policy response to this dilemma.  It is aware of the 
problem of male control of loans, and of its near intractability in the context of contemporary 
gender relations in Bangladesh, and in response, it makes efforts to ensure that women retain 
control over decision-making and accounts, however the loan is actually used.  It requires its 
women borrowers to provide accurate and continuous accounts of loan use and encourages 
informal contracts between women and the users of loans if women are not the primary users. 
 
6. DIFFERENCES IN WOMEN'S LOAN CONTROL IN THE FOUR ORGANISATIONS 
STUDIED 
Differences in women's loan control record in the organisations studied point to the impact of 
different policy approaches.  However, the small size of the samples once disaggregated by 
organisation caution against drawing firm conclusions from the findings, raising problems of 
sample biases by region, different performance records of individual credit societies, group 
maturity, and more constrained ranges of investment activities and loan sizes.  
 
The best performing sample were the Grameen Bank borrowers (N = 53), with 62% of the loan 
histories showing full or significant loan use, and just 10% of loans in the 'Very Limited' or 'No 
Involvement' category.6  This most probably owes to the Grameen Bank's strong encouragement 
of borrowers to invest initial loans in livestock ( fully 71.7% of loans in the sample were used for 
this), and its insistence that productive investments (livestock, land, housing) be registered as 
women's property.  TMSS (N = 39) also scored well, with 41% of loan histories showing full or 
partial involvement, and 25% in the two lowest categories.  Here, loan investment strategies 
were more diverse, venturing into small businesses such as yoghurt making (20%) and house 
construction (17.5%).  Higher degrees of loan control here might owe to the organisation's 
insistence on proof of women's managerial control, and to the long periods it invests in 
institution building, social development, and consciousness-raising work. 
 
Twenty-eight percent of the loan histories in the BRAC sample (N = 106) showed full or 
significant loan control, while 45% fell into the two lowest categories.  The BRAC sample had 
the largest proportion of women using their loans for forms of rural enterprises in which men 
normally dominate (10.4% in rickshaw purchasing, 6.6% in crop farming, 9.4% in vegetable 
trading 6.6% in rice stocking for resale, 4% in sericulture).  It would be unfair to interpret this 
result as an indictment of BRAC's strategy of encouraging non-traditional investment for women 
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- following the argument of the previous section, it represents an important strategy for 
challenging negative ascriptions of the value of women's income-generating activities.  The 
result does, however, point to the importance of accompanying new credit deployment strategies 
with adequate social development inputs.  Also, lesser degrees of women's loan control might be 
a consequence of the rapid scaling-up of credit delivery.    
 
In RD-12,  31% of the loan histories (N = 55) were in the full or significant category, and the 
majority, 56%, in the two lowest categories.  The RD-12 sample showed the greatest diversity in 
patterns of actual loan use of all the samples, but also, a high concentration in traditionally male-
dominated activities (16.4% in rickshaw purchasing, 11% in rice stocking for trade).  Lower 
degrees of loan control may attest to the generally higher socio-economic status of its women 
members.  A recent study of loan impact in RD-12 found the literacy levels of women members 
to be 14% over the national average (Matienzo, 1993), which suggests, given the association 
between women's literacy and household resource endowment, that poorer women are not being 
targeted effectively.  Studies of women's economic activity in Bangladesh have found that 
women from better-off households tend to have a lesser role in household production decisions 
than do poorer women (Safilios-Rothschild and Mahmud, Chapter 1: 1989; Rosario, 1992).   
 
On the surface, these findings seem to go against the direction of the suggestions in the previous 
section regarding enhancing women's loan control, as the most 'minimalist' programme in terms 
of social development investments, the Grameen Bank, performed the best in terms of women's 
control.  The implications of this finding can work in several directions.  On the one hand, 
arguably the contribution of Grameen Bank credit to changing gender relations may be minimal 
insofar as loans are kept relatively small and loan activities remain highly traditional.  On the 
other hand, it provides a few very key forms of programme support which may be more effective 
at strengthening women's rights of asset ownership and social status than many of the other 
strategies suggested.  One of these elements is the intense energy which goes into creating and 
maintaining a culture of discipline and belonging in each borrowing kendra or centre, which 
contributes to institutionalising women's rights to credit.  Another is the insistence that new 
assets gained through a loan be registered in the woman borrower's name -- from the receipt for 
the purchase of a cow to the registering of land or a house.  Nevertheless, there is probably a 
point beyond which this strategy cannot go as a means of long-term change in gender relations 
given the neglect of efforts to enhance women's direct market access. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
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This paper has problemmatised the issue of women's loss of direct control over their loans, 
although it recognises the difficulty of establishing clear patterns of loan control once credit 
enters the rural household.  In highlighting the poverty of assumptions that women's high 
repayment rates and sustained high demand for loans can be assumed to reflect effective loan 
investment strategies by women, the paper raises a number of isues for further research regarding 
the empowerment contribution of credit to women.  These include the possibility that high 
degrees of male control of loans can postpone the appearance of the positive social externalities 
expected from increasing women's control over household income, or worse, that it can 
undermine household survival strategies where men invest loans badly, forcing women to 
mobilise repayment funds from resources which would otherwise be used for consumption or 
savings purposes.  Another issue regards the potential of loan transfers to exacerbate gender-
related tensions within the rural household.  
 
The discussion in this paper bears importantly on current debates about the transformative 
capacity of small-scale credit and income-generating programmes.  The uncertain economic 
environment in the rural arena over the 1980s has favoured an increasing focus on credit and 
income-generating programmes in general - for women as well as men.  As Sanyal argues, the 
failure of rural industries in Bangladesh to absorb growing numbers of landless people has 
prompted the focus since the late 1970s on informal sector enterprises managed by the poor as 
alternative sources for income and employment generation.  In tandem with this,  there has been 
a shift in the donor environment to favour private initiative capitalism as a better guarantee of 
efficient market responses than traditional top-down government poverty-alleviation measures 
(1991: 1367).  Credit programmes have gained even further in popularity to the degree that they 
promise the possibility of cost-recovery; as low-income borrowers demonstrate their repayment 
capacity at market rates of interest,  donors can satisfy their ambitions for financially sustainable 
development (cf: Biggs, Snodgrass, and Srivastava, 1989).   
 
Critics of self-employment initiatives claim that the emphasis on informal sector economic 
enhancements overlooks the structural factors that maintain the economic marginalisation of the 
poor.  Credit and income-generating programmes frame the problem of poverty as a temporary, 
and easily remedied, cash-flow problem, instead of one which bears on relations of inequality 
and their institutionalisation in broader economic policy (White, 1991).  This critique is 
particularly germane to assessments of whether these programmes can promote women's 
economic and social empowerment.  One of the many lessons of the history of women's 
involvement in rural development programmes has been that unless substitutes are found for 
women's reproductive work at home, women's experience of participation can be negative, 
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exacting a high cost in terms of intensified demands on women's labour.  The promotion of 
small-scale enterprises gets around this problem by concentrating on improving the productivity 
of women's homestead-based work - which allows them to fulfil their domestic responsibilities 
at the same time.  This postpones any feminist concerns with redistributing gendered domestic 
responsibilities - which are, after all, a structural feature of unequal gender relations - and limits 
the potential for skills acquisition, exposure to the 'public' world, and job-based organisation 
associated with gaining formal sector employment.  The input-delivery focus of credit and 
income-generation programmes involves an implicit assumption that easing women's access to 
credit translates unproblematically into their control over its use.  Economic empowerment, 
however, is not as straightforward a process as this; gendered power relations within the 
household affect the distribution and use of cash resources, and may undermine women's 
capacity to retain control over the way a loan is invested, or profits used. 
 
The successes of special credit programmes in reaching women must be acknowledged as highly 
impressive, given the socio-cultural conditions which they challenge.  In some ways, what this 
paper points to is a 'second-generation' problem; the 'first-generation' problem having been 
managing institutional changes in order to provide for women's access to credit in the first place.7  
Most of these programmes acknowledge the problems which gender power relations pose for 
women's control of loans; they offer integrated programmes designed to enhance women's 
institution-building at the grass-roots level, provide technology and training supports for 
women's investments, and some programmes, particularly those managed by women's NGOs, 
work to raise women's consciousness about gender and class relations.   
 
These laudable interventions run in some respects counter to the implications for programme 
management of the rapid scaling-up of credit delivery and recovery operations.  Improvements in 
women's productivity, mobility, access to markets, literacy, social status, and control of 
household decisions takes time, requires considerable commitment by development workers,  a 
long-term investment in local-level processes of social change, as well as a willingness to cope 
with the sometimes violent and disruptive consequences of challenging class and gender 
privilege.  This is even more true when it comes to changing social attitudes towards women's 
right of ownership over resources and to assigning value to women's contributions to household 
well-being.   The drive for increased credit disbursement and recovery, however, is insensitive to 
social development needs, and may be particularly insensitive to the special problems women 
face in developing the capacity to use their loans.   
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International aid donors bear some responsibility for this process.  Donors' interests in seeing the 
development of financially self-sustaining rural development institutions has resulted in a 
preoccupation with cost-recovery, to the degree that loan repayment rates have become the 
primary index of success, however much they may obscure the important issue of the quality of 
loan use.  Ironically, this might also be seen as an unintended consequence of the success of 
gender and development policy lobbies.  Women's inclusion in many development sectors, one 
of the achievements of the gender and development lobby, has tended to be a quantitative affair; 
the concern is with increasing numbers, and less with the quality and meaning of women's 
participation.  The latter raises difficult problems about the political orientation of the 
development process; problems about power relations between women and men from the 
household to the state.  That these concerns, which have been at the centre of the agenda of 
gender and development advocates, tend to evaporate in the proces of policy implementation, 
attests to the importance of institutional change in development organisations to bring women's 
interests into decision-making processes, from the top-level of policy making to the impact level 
of the household. 
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NOTES 
 
 
1.  Entitled: "Women's Leadership in Rural Development in Bangladesh", this study was funded 
by the UK Economic and Social Research Council and conducted under the auspices of the 
Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, and the Bangladesh Institute of 
Development Studies in Dhaka.  Field work was carried out between February and October 
1993. 
 
2.  There are exceptions.  A landmark evaluation of this type was conducted by Rushidan Islam 
Rahman, studying the Grameen Bank (1986), in which the definition of 'impact of credit' on the 
beneficiary was extended beyond income and employment questions to women's decision-
making role in deciding upon the investment  activity, labour inputs, and use of profits, as well 
as changes in attitudes towards women borrowers on the part of male household members, 
changes in women's self-perceptions, capacites to invest in personal well-being, capacities to 
assume control over their physical integrity and reproductive rights, and attitudes towards their 
daughters' education and future prospects.  There is a study currently underway, managed by 
Jahangir Nagar University and John Snow International, which will likely provide the most 
comprehensive information so far on these issues, most particularly the relation between credit 
and family planning acceptance (see Schuler and Hashemi, 1992). 
 
3.  This question is underwritten by a concern which is most easily defined as a feminist one and 
has been asked in different ways in a range of feminist critiques of the development process.  
See, for example, Jaquette, 1990;  or Kandiyoti, 1988. 
 
4.   Loan use patterns were not recorded for SNPS as its credit facilities are extended not to 
individual borrowers but to groups, for collective investment. 
 
5.   Ackerly's study identifies a similar set of repayment scenarios (1995). 
 
6.  Interestingly, this corresponds closely with the finding in Rahman's 1986 study of the 
Grameen Bank which showed a 12% rate of loan appropriation by male relatives of women 
borrowers. 
7.  We are gratefil to Harold Alderman for this insight. 
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TABLE I 
Increase in Women's Membership of Credit Programmes in 
Bangladesh, Early 1980s to 1992 
Organisation Women as a % of Membership 
 1991-1992   1980-83 
Grameen Bank 93.3 39 
BRAC 74 34* 
RPP (RD-12) 59** 8.3 
   
* Figure for 1986 
Grameen Bank, 1992 
BRAC, 1992 
RD-12/CRT, 1993. 
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TABLE II 
Comparative Information on Selected Special Credit Programmes in Bangladesh 
Period:  1990 - mid-1992 
Organisation Number of Members Women as 
% of total 
Credit Disbursed 
(TK 000,000) 
% of Credit 
to Women 
 Women Men  Women Men  
Grameen 
Bank 
1,186,826 84,635 93.3 1721* 143* 92.3 
BRAC 482,014 167,260 74 1218 602 67 
RD-12 204,775 141,547 59 287 247 54 
Sources:    
Grameen Bank, 1992 
BRAC, 1992 
RD-12:  CRT, 1993 
 
* Data on credit disbursed by the Grameen Bank taken from its 1990 annual Report 
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    FIGURE I 
DEGREE OF WOMEN'S CONTROL OVER LOANS
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    FIGURE II 
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    FIGURE III 
DEGREE OF LOAN CONTROL BY INVESTMENT
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    FIGURE IV 
DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER LOAN USE BY
AMOUNT (N=253)
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FIGURE V 
 
DEGREE OF LOAN CONTROL BY YEARS OF
MEMBERSHIP IN CREDIT SOCIETY
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111 Entitled: "Women's Leadership in Rural Development in Bangladesh", this study was funded by the ESRC and 
conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, and the 
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies in Dhaka.  Field work was carried out between February and October 
1993. 
2  There are exceptions.  A landmark evaluation of this type was conducted by Rushidan Islam Rahman, studying the 
Grameen Bank (1986), in which the definition of 'impact of credit' on the beneficiary was extended beyond income 
and employment questions to women's decision-making role in deciding upon the investment  activity, labour inputs, 
and use of profits, as well as changes in attitudes towards women borrowers on the part of male household members, 
changes in women's self-perceptions, capacites to invest in personal well-being, capacities to assume control over 
their physical integrity and reproductive rights, and attitudes towards their daughters' education and future prospects.  
There is a study currently underway, managed by Jahangir Nagar University and John Snow International, which 
will likely provide the most comprehensive information so far on these issues, most particularly the relation between 
credit and family planning acceptance (see Schuler and Hashemi, 1992). 
3 This question is underwritten by a concern which is most easily defined as a feminist one and has been asked in 
different ways in a range of feminist critiques of the development process.  See, for example, Jaquette, 1990;  or 
Kandiyoti, 1988. 
4 Loan use patterns were not recorded for SNPS as its credit facilities are extended not to individual borrowers but to 
groups, for collective investment. 
5  Ackerly's study identifies a similar set of repayment scenarios (1995). 
6 Interestingly, this corresponds closely with the finding in Rahman's 1986 study of the Grameen Bank which 
showed a 12% rate of loan appropriation by male relatives of women borrowers. 
7 We are grateful to Harold Alderman for this insight. 
